Komarine Romdenh-Romluc

2024. Fanon, the body schema, and white solipsism. Southern Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming.

Fanon argues that colonialism results in black awareness of oneself as object-like in various ways. But how is white self-awareness impacted?

2022. Fanon, the Recovery of African History, and the Nekyia. European Journal of Philosophy, online: https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12835.

Why was Fanon suspicious of attempts to recover African history?

2021. Now-thoughts. European Journal of Philosophy 30 (2): 623-628.

How should we understand the nature of our thoughts about ‘now’?.

2021. Merleau-Ponty: Perception and methodology. In H. Logue and L. Richardson (eds.) Purpose and Procedure in Philosophy of Perception. Oxford: OUP, 258—275.

What methods did Merleau-Ponty adopt in his studies of perception?

2018. The human space of the railway carriage. In A. Crawley-Jackson and C. Leffler (eds.) Railway Cultures. Sheffield: University of Sheffield and National Railway Museum, pp. 58-63.
A look at the railway carriage through the lens of phenomenology.

2018. Gestalt perception and seeing-as. In M. Beaney, B. Harrington, D. Shaw (eds.) Aspect Perception After Wittgenstein: Seeing-As and Novelty. New York: Routledge, pp. 89-107.
An investigation into Gestalt perception and seeing-as from the perspective of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy.

2018. Science in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology: from the early work to the later philosophy. In D. Zahavi (ed.) Oxford Handbook of the History of Phenomenology: Oxford: OUP, pp. 340-359.
Merleau-Ponty on science and phenomenology as fundamentally the same sort of investigation.

2017. The World and I. In my edited volume Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty. London: Routledge, pp. 81-99
Merleau-Ponty and Wittengstein on solipsism (the view that I am in some sense alone) as an ordinary feature of experience. 

2017. Hermeneutical injustice and the problem of authority. Feminist Philosophy Quarterly (3) 3. Article 1.
Does justice demand that we accept disadvantaged groups’ understandings of the world? 

2016. Hermeneutical injustice: blood-sports and the English Defence League. Social Epistemology, 30 (5-6): 592-610.
Fricker’s account of hermeneutical injustice relies on two inconsistent intuitions that cannot be reconciled within her framework. Published version available online here

2015. Image: for the eye and in mind. In M. Nitsche (ed.) Image in Space. Verlag Traugott Bautz, pp. 77-96.
Merleau-Ponty’s account of image as he presents it in his Eye and Mind.

2015. Merleau-Ponty: actions, habits, and skilled expertise. In D. Dahlstrom, A. Elpidorou, W. Hopp (eds.) Philosophy of Mind and Phenomenology: Conceptual and Empirical Approaches. Routledge, pp. 98-116.
Merleau-Ponty on action and agency. 

2014. Habit and attention. In D. Moran and R. Jensen (eds.) The Phenomenology of Embodied Subjectivity. Springer, pp. 3-19.
Habit and attention – the role they play in our actions and how to understand this within Merleau-Ponty’s framework.

2013. First-person awareness of intentions and immunity to error through misidentification. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 21 (4) pp. 493-514.
How to construe first-person awareness of intentions, in the light of challenges posed by the simulation hypothesis?

2012. Thought in action. In D. Zahavi (ed.) Oxford Handbook of Phenomenology. OUP, pp. 198-215.
How to understand thought’s role in action on Merleau-Ponty’s account.

2011. Time for consciousness: intention and introspection. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 10 (3) pp. 369-76.
How to understand the nature of conscious intention in the light of Wegner’s and Libet’s empirical arguments against the existence of free will.

2011. Agency and embodied cognition. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. CXI, Part I, pp. 79-95.
If human cognition is embodied, then we should adopt a Merleau-Pontyian account of agency.

2011. Merleau-Ponty. In Routledge Companion to Phenomenology. London: Routledge, pp. 103-12.
An extremely brief overview of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy.

2009. Merleau-Ponty’s account of hallucination. European Journal of Philosophy, 17 (1) pp. 76-90.
Merleau-Ponty on the nature of hallucination.

2008. First-person thought and the use of ‘I’. Synthese, 163 (2) pp. 145-56.
What can uses of ‘I’ tell us about first-person thought?

2007. Merleau-Ponty and the power to reckon with the possible. In T. Baldwin (ed.) Reading Merleau-Ponty. London: Routledge, pp. 44-58.
Merleau-Ponty’s account of action and the role played in it by ‘the power to reckon with the possible’.

2007. Suppressed belief. Theoria, 22 (58) pp. 17-24.
Suppressed beliefs as practical beliefs that are inconsistent with those the agent consciously self-attributes.

2006. ‘I’. Philosophical Studies, 128(2) pp. 257-83.
A new account of indexical reference.

2005. The essential indexical. In Elsevier Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics, Second Edition.
A brief overview of issues surrounding the essential indexical.

2005. Immunity to error through misidentification. In Elsevier Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics, Second Edition.
A brief overview of the phenomenon known as ‘immunity to error through misidentification’ – what it is, and why it is held to be significant in understanding self-knowledge.

2002. Now the French are invading England! Analysis, 62 (1) pp. 34-41.
Answering machine paradoxes and other puzzles, and how to account for them.